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John 0. Haley*

Luck, Law, Culture and Trade: The
Intractability of United States-Japan
Trade Conflict

The tensions and conflicts between the United States and Japan arising
from their bilateral economic relationship are neither new nor novel.
Throughout the century, Japan's industrial trading partners-including
the United States-criticized what they perceived to be unfair, mercantilist trade practices by Japanese exporters. 1 Over the past decade as
U.S. trade deficits have mounted and Japan's surplus has steadily
increased, however, the strains between the two countries have become
dangerously acute, with predictable consequences: not only has the
trade relationship between the two countries become a major domestic
political issue, it is now also one of the most studied topics of the post2
war era.
Except perhaps for firm-specific data, guarded out of proprietary
concern for secrecy, most if not all of the basic facts are widely known.
Few if any significant aspects of the trading relationship between the
United States and Japan have escaped economic, political or legal analysis. Not that this deluge of commentary and data has produced consensus. Controversy persists on both sides of the Pacific over the most basic
issues-the causes and consequences of Japan's postwar economic success and the apparent failure of the United States to respond effectively.
This debate has pitted Japan specialist againstJapan specialist in the
United States 3 and intensified political division within both coun*

Professor of Law and of East Asian Studies; Director, The Henry M. Jackson

School of International Studies, University of Washington, Seattle.
1. See, e.g., Ishii, Wanted Fair Play, in CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 179, 180 (1934),
describing European charges of "Japanese economic aggression."
2. See, e.g., R. SORICH, RESOURCE REvIEW FOR THE U.S.-JAPAN ECONOMIC AGENDA:
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF REPORTS AND PUBLICATIONS 1980-1985 (Council on

Religion and International Affairs) (1985), listing nearly 850 English language
monographs, articles and government reports on United States-Japanese trade
between 1980 and 1985 alone.
3. Compare, e.g., Patrick & Rosovsky, Japan 's Economic Peformance: An Overview, in
AsIA'S NEw GIANT 3-61 (Patrick & Rosovsky eds. 1976) with C. JOHNSON, MITI AND

THE JAPANESE MIRACLE (1982). See also Johnson, Studies of Japanese Political Econony,
22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 403 (1989)
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tries. 4 Writing in the mid-1980s, Stephen D. Cohen summarized the
tensions:
The post-World War ILreduction in global trade barriers and the corresponding rise in international economic interdependence brought the
Japanese and U.S. industrial sectors into close contact. Although they
were indisputably two of modem history's strongest economies, one
achieved greater competitive success than the other. In international
trade terms, the result was a serious bilateral trade imbalance whose economic significance was overwhelmed by a growing communications gap. 5
Unfortunately, the problem is not merely one of miscommunication
or differences in perception between, in Cohen's words, "the image in
Japan of the United States as bully and the image in the United States of
Japan as selfish manipulator of unfair trade practices." '6 Behind both
the monthly trade figures and the public quarrel lie profound differences in the two societies' institutional and cultural environments, which
influence both economic and political behavior. Pivotal are the differences in the shared values, attitudes and expectations toward law and
the state-in other words, their legal cultures- that shape and concomitantly are shaped by the institutional arrangements for social ordering.
Underlying the economic and political issues that divide the United
States and Japan are gaps in attitudes and expectations toward law and
its uses as an instrument of social ordering and control. Interwoven into
the social fabric of both nations are basic assumptions about the role of
the state and the role of law as a means of regulating social order.
These assumptions influence not only patterns of livelihood and social
reality, they also delimit the perceptions of what instrumental means for
political and economic policy are available or desirable in each society.
My aim in this essay is to attempt to define these contrasts as they relate
to trade and their contribution to the intractability of trade conflict
between the two nations. Part One commences with an overview of
Japan's postwar economic growth and describes the context of the trade
problem, emphasizing the significance of Japan's protectionist policies
and the pattern of the American response. Part Two offers an interpretive analysis of the two legal cultures and attempts to explain the interplay between law and trade. The concluding section contends that
continued trade conflict is inevitable. Settlement is not politically possible in either country.
The argument in Part One, briefly stated, is that Japan's postwar
economic performance was at least as much a consequence of fortuitous
THEJAPAN FOUNDATION NEWSLET'rER, Vol. XVI, No. 3, Dec. 1988, p. 1; D. FRIEDMAN,
THE MISUNDERSTOOD MIRACLE: INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
JAPAN 326 (1988).

4. See, e.g., Hellmann,JapanesePolitics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democray Wl'ithin an
American Greenhouse, in 2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFJAPAN: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 345, 363-74 (Inoguchi & Okimoto eds. 1988).
5. S. COHEN, UNEASY PARTNERSHIP: COMPETITION AND CONFLICT IN U.S.-JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS 7 (1985).

6. Id. at 2.
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circumstances beyond Japan's control as the industrial policies of a talented and percipient bureaucracy or the invisible hand of the free market. However, asJapan recovered and domestic consumption expanded,
both the protectionist features of Japan's industrial policy and market
forces stimulated vigorous firm rivalry among domestic enterprises,
especially in industries in which there had been significant new entry.
These events have in turn combined to foster the competitive strength
of certain industries in international markets. By the mid-1970s the Japanese economy was thus characterized both by select, highly competitive
industries, such as electronics and motor vehicle manufacturing and also
by significantly less efficient industries dominated by firms and industries whose survival often depended upon consensual domestic trade
restraints as well as protection from foreign competition.
Except in the case of cotton textiles, the United States hardly
responded at all to Japan's trade practices or policies until the late
1960s. Even then, paradoxically the United States' official advocacy of
liberal international trade policies and multilateral solutions to trade
conflict impelled the United States to seek informal, unilateral restraints
by Japan to curtail competition in U.S. markets rather than to engage in
a sustained effort to gain access for U.S. producers to Japanese markets.
This protectionist emphasis in turn tended to benefit Japan by fostering
even greater efficiencies by the most effective Japanese rivals to U.S.
firms as well as greater entrenchment by the least efficient sectors of the
Japanese economy. The ultimate consequence was to postpone and
thus to intensify future trade conflict.
Part Two turns to attitudes toward law, the state and consensual
means of governance. Part Two contends that in the historical context
of U.S.-Japan trade relations, the relative strength of private, consensual
mechanisms for maintaining social order and for containing state power
in Japan, in contrast to the weakness of social controls and corresponding reliance on law and state power in the United States, has exacerbated trade conflict. Not only do these differences impair effective
governmental resolution, but they also preclude the moral claims of
reciprocity.
This Article concludes that, along with the increased influence of
the Japanese Diet and the U.S. Congress in formulating trade policy,
these patterns of social ordering can be expected to sustain, if not
greatly intensify, trade conflict between the two nations.
I. Japan in the Postwar Period
A. Economic Recovery and Growth
No single set of factors adequately explains Japan's economic recovery
and growth as a global trading power. However instrumental the industrial policies of the developmental state 7 or the forces of free markets
7. See, e.g., C. JOHNSON, slipra note 3.
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and firm rivalry,8 Japan's postwar economic performance owes much to
a complex combination of fortuitous, exogenous circumstances and
seemingly endemic cultural traits, such as high savings rates and hard
work. In a word, Japan was lucky.
Not the least important of the factors beyond manipulative control
that contributed to Japan's economic growth was a liberal postwar economic and political order designed and maintained by the United States.
The postwar Pax Americana established a stable framework for the relatively unrestricted movement of capital and goods with a corollary guarantee of security in both the Atlantic and Pacific communities. Within
the postwar system, Japan could count upon access across the Pacific to
American markets, as well as worldwide, to vital raw materials without
the costly necessity of maintaining a self-sufficient military establishment. For the first time in modern Japanese history, the state could fully
devote its efforts and resources to create the social and economic infrastructure necessary for the expansion of productive capacity.
The United States was also responsible for internal legal, economic
and political reforms that enabled Japan to respond effectively to its new
international environment. As Takafusa Nakamura has observed:
The externally imposed occupation reforms greatly changed the fixed system of the prewar Japanese economy and ended by preparing a rich soil
not only for "democratization" but also for economic growth. For example, the rise in both farmers' and workers' incomes and the expansion of
consumption capacity as well as the dissolution and the elimination of
excessive concentration, combined to produce the competitive conditions
that were indispensable for this growth. 9
Nakamura could have added two critical reforms to his list. First,
the demilitarization of Japan with constitutional prohibitions against a
military establishment allowed Japan to withstand future domestic and
international pressure to direct substantial resources to maintain external security. Second, the Allied Occupation initiated and left in place
the legal framework for governmental regulation of foreign exchange,
trade and investment. As detailed below these controls provided
Japan's economic bureaucracies with the instruments of protectionism
as well as the leverage for direction of domestic economic activity. No
Japanese Diet had before or would since give Japanese officials so extensive an array of legal controls and powers.
Two other exogenous factors deserve mention. One was the
Korean War. The increase in Japan's dollar reserves resulting from U.S.
military procurement between 1950 and 1952 enabled Japan, at a critical
juncture in its recovery, to more than double its imports of raw materials
used to expand industrial production' 0 (and, one might add, its imports
of foreign technology).
8. See, e.g., Patrick & Rosovsky, supra note 3.
9. T. NAKAMURA, THE POSTWAR JAPANESE
STRUCTURE 48 (Kominski trans. 1981).

10. Id. at 41-42.
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Another was the discovery and development of new mineral
resources within Japan's Pacific Basin periphery. Except for oil, by the
late 1960s, nearly all of Japan's most critical needs for industrial raw
materials could be met from sources within a few days of overseas transportation. From the great fir forests of Western Canada and the U.S.
Pacific Northwest to Australia's cornucopia of mineral deposits, the
abundant natural resources of the Pacific Basin fuelled (quite literally in
the case of oil and coal) Japan's continued industrial expansion. The
contribution of new mineral discoveries in Australia from 1955 to 1970
deserves special emphasis.
Most contemporary analyses of the Japanese economy seem to take
Australia's vast mineral resources for granted. Virtually ignored is the
fact that nearly all of Australia's major mineral resources other than
gold, lead and zinc were not discovered until the late 1950s and 1960s.
At the end of World War II, Australia was thought by most experts to
have few if any major deposits of ore, except for lead and zinc. Only
minor deposits of iron ore, copper, tin, and tungsten were known to
exist. Australia had no known bauxite or nickel deposits, and any deposits of manganese and uranium were considered to be rare or trivial. I I
Beginning with the discovery of bauxite at Weipa, between 1955 and
1973 Australian geologists had discovered by world standards very large
deposits of iron ore and major deposits of copper, nickel, tin, manganese and uranium. Most of these newly discovered resources were
located near the sea and thus accessible for efficient exploitation and
transport. These discoveries coincided with Japan's full economic
recovery in the early 1960s and were critical for the rapid expansion of
its industrial capacity from the mid-1960s. With long-term supply contracts Japanese industry financed the development of these resources
and gained in return an assured supply of vital resources at stable costs.
The significance of Australia to Japan's economic expansion is
exemplified by the case of steel. Citing a 1983 study by Barnett and
Schorsch 12 comparing U.S. andJapanese costs for producing cold rolled
sheet steel (used in automobiles, appliances and cans), Eads and Nelson
note that between 1958 and 1980, "Japan turned a U.S. cost advantage
of $14 per ton (12 percent), into a Japanese advantage of $588 per ton
(31 percent)."' 13 They attribute this successful effort to improve Japanese competitiveness in part "to shrewd purchasing of raw materials,
especially iron ore." However, they mostly credit Japanese labor productivity. "In 1958," they note, "Japanese steel makers used 36.65 manhours of labor to make a ton of steel. By 1980 this had been reduced by
11. King, History of Development of Resources of Metallic Ores, in MONOGRAPHS OF EcoNOMIC GEOLOGY OF AUSTRALIA & PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1973), reprintedin A. TRENCOVE,
DISCOVERY 251, 265 (1979).
12.

D. BARNETT' & L. SCHORSCH, STEEL: UPHEAVAL IN A BASIC INDUSTRY 20, 64

(1983), cited in Eads & Nelson, Japanese High Technology Policy: What Lessons for the
United States, in JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 243, 258, 259 (Patrick ed.
1986).
13. Eads & Nelson, supra note 12, at 258, 259.
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84 percent to 5.84 man-hours."' 14 Ignored, however, is the fact that
these productivity gains were largely offset by wage increases. Barnett
and Schorsch show that, in terms of labor, the unit cost in dollars of cold
rolled steel in the U.S. in 1958 was $43 per ton. By 1980 the U.S. cost
had more than tripled to $135. This increase is attributed to an increase
in the dollars per man-hour of labor from $3.75 in 1958 to $18.80 in
1980 in comparison to the man-hours per ton reduction of 11.58 in
1958 to 7.20 in 1980. InJapan, however, although the number of manhours of labor to produce an equivalent quantity of steel was reduced
much more as noted, Japanese labor wages per hour increased from
$.58 in 1958 to $11.00 in 1980, more than six times the U.S. increase.
As a result, relative labor costs per ton in Japan remained nearly the
same-also tripling from $21 per ton in 1958 to $64 per ton in 1980.
Productivity gains did not therefore translate directly into competitive
price advantage for Japanese steelmakers (although, as noted below,
these gains were important to the expansion of private savings and consumer markets).
The primary factor in the reduction of Japanese steelmakers' costs
relative to their American competitors was instead Japan's access to less
costly iron ore and stoking coal. Although the dollar cost for the Japanese of iron ore per ton of cold rolled steel doubled from $22 in 1958 to
$46 in 1980, it quadrupled for American producers from $15 to $58
during the same period. Similarly, in the case of stoking coal, Japan's
costs increased from $19 to $58 per ton of steel, but U.S. costs increased
even more, from $11 to $45, a threefold increase forJapan as compared
to a fourfold increase for the United States. The Japanese cost advantage gained between 1958 and 1980 can thus be explained almost
entirely by access to relatively cheaper iron ore and coal, most of which
was imported from the new Australian mines they helped to develop.
The postwar wage gains of Japanese steelworkers were not an isolated exception. Concomitant with the expansion of Japanese industry
were steady increases in Japanese real earnings. In comparative terms,
Japanese workers outpaced their American and West European counterparts by wide margins. Galenson and Odaka, for example, estimate that
between 1962 and 1972, the average annual increase in real earnings in
manufacturing in Japan was almost double that of West Germany and
six times the U.S. average. 15 Ikuo Kume goes even further to suggest
that by 1974 wage gains had actually begun to discourage industrial
16
investment.
Productivity increases and the concomitant rise in disposable
income in Japan did play an important role. They produced a rapid
expansion of savings and consumption. As summarized by Kosai and
14. Id.
15. Galenson & Odaka, TheJapanese Labor .Market, in AsIA's NEw GIANT, supra note
3, at 656.
16. Kume, Changing Relations Among the Government, Labor and Business in Japan after
the Oil Crisis, 42 INT'L ORG. 659, 660 (1988).
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Ogino, "The increased purchasing power of the masses expanded internal demand, and made mass production of consumer durables possible,
thus supporting economic growth." 17 The growth of domestic consumption capacity was in turn critical for continued industrial expansion, although one should add the growth of plant and equipment
8
investment as well.'
Until the mid-1970s, domestic consumption rather than exports
thus provided the primary source of demand necessary for Japanese
industrial growth. In the case of automobiles, for example, between
1957 and 1970,Japanese automobile production grew at an average rate
of 58 percent per year. Although the percentage of exports also
increased steadily each year, until 1965 Japanese automobile manufacturers exported less than 10 percent of their total production and did
not begin to export more than a fifth of their production until 1970.19
The automobile industry was not exceptional. Until the mid-1970s
exports accounted for only about 10 percent of Japanese GNP. Even as
late as 1984, domestic consumption absorbed 80 percent of the cotton
fabric, 66 percent of the crude steel, 65 percent of the machine tools, 78
percent of the transistors and decoders and over 40 percent of all
20
automobiles produced in Japan.
Two and a half decades of continuously expanding consumption
capacity does not, however, fully explain why Japan was able to maintain
high rates of economic growth or to emerge as a trading power. Protectionism and firm rivalry also played key roles.
B.

The Role of Protectionism

In broad outline, formalJapanese restrictions on foreign entry began in
the twilight years of the Allied Occupation with the enactment of the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law in 194921 and the
Foreign Investment Law in 1950.22 These two statutes, initiated and
drafted by Occupation authorities, represented the first truly comprehensive legislative measures to regulate foreign trade and investment in
modern Japanese history. 23 The only comparable statutes were the significantly less restrictive foreign exchange controls enacted in the
1930s.24

Both of these statutes were initially designed as temporary, emergency legislation, and Japanese officials were surprisingly reluctant at
17. T. KoSAI & T. OGINO,

THE CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE ECONOMY 110

(1984).

18. T. NAKAMURA, supra note 9, at 49, 50.

19. See M.
20.

CUSUMANO, THE JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 4-5 (1985).
T. OKUDA, JAPAN'S INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY 82 (International Society for Educa-

tional Information, Monograph No. 52) (1987).
21. Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku boeki kaii hW(Law No. 228 1949).
22. Gaishi ni kansunt hiiitsu (Law No. 163 1950).

23. SeeJ.

COHEN, JAPAN'S ECONOMY IN WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION

(1949).

24. See, e.g., Gaikoku kawase kanri hi (Law No. 28 1938); see also Sat6 v. Japan, 16
Keishii 193 (Gr. Ct. Cass., 3d Crim. Dept, Dec. 3, 1936) (invalidating regulations
issued under statute as ultra vires).
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first to accept either. 25 Only gradually did Japan's economic bureaucracies fully discover their utility as instruments of domestic and international economic policy. The years from 1945 to 1955 thus constituted
the most open postwar period for foreign entry and participation injapanese markets. Japan's relative needs for capital, U.S. dollar reserves,
and foreign technology were never to be as great. But few foreign firms
were interested. The postwar expansion of the American market had
begun and, overseas, investment in Europe still seemed far more inviting than Japan. Some U.S. firms, notably IBM and Coca-Cola, were
more farsighted, but otherwise, except for firms in the basic oil, chemical and metals industries, most U.S. enterprises spurned this window of
26
opportunity.
Japan's impulse toward protectionism reached its zenith in the
period from 1955 to 1960 under the first Five Year Plan. Designed to
free Japan from dependency on U.S.-military procurement orders and to
overcome seemingly chronic balance of payments deficits, the objective
of the plan was to develop Japan's self-sufficiency by promoting exports
and restricting imports. As described by Komiya and Itoh:
On the one hand, exports were promoted by such policy measures as subsidies, provision of low-interest loans for promising export industries,
and preferential tax treatment of income from exports and for exploration of new export markets. These measures were meant to lower costs
for exporters and to give incentives to export. On the other hand, since
imports would naturally increase along with economic growth, they had
to be restrained as much as possible. Imports of raw materials and
machinery essential for domestic production were given priority, whereas
imports of consumption goods and goods that could be produced domes27
tically had to be severely restricted under the disequilibrium system.
The means available were relatively simple. In addition to establishing tariffs and quotas, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law provided for a system of approvals for allocation of foreign
exchange and of licenses for imports and exports. This statute and the
regulations issued thereunder were also used in conjunction with the
Foreign Investment Law to restrict foreign enterprises from leapfrogging import barriers by setting up either branch offices or subsidiaries in
Japan. Although between 1956 and 1963 foreign investors willing to
forgo government guarantees for repatriation of profits could establish
"yen-based companies" allowing investment of profits in Japan, even
this avenue was closed in 1963. Ironically, Japan's entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") in 1964
25. Haley, Toward a Reappraisal of the Occupation Legal Reforms: Administrative
Accountability, in EIBEI H6 RONSHU: TANAKA HIDEO SENSEI KANREKI KINEN 543, 565
(Essays on Anglo-American Law: In celebration of Hideo Tanaka's 61" birthday)

(1987).
26. D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE INJAPAN 18 (1973).

InternationalTrade and Trade Policy. 1955-1984, in 2 TIE
27. Komiya & Itoh,Japan "s
POLITICAL ECONOMY OFJAPAN: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, supra note 4,

at 176-77.
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brought even more stringent restrictions. 28 Thus armed with broadly
defined discretionary authority and an array of approval and licensing
powers under these statutes, Japan's economic bureaucracies managed
29
to erect a seemingly impenetrable barrier against outside competitors.
At home, however, governmental economic policies to induce concentration and restrain competition did not fare well. Fearful that unrestrained market rivalry would prevent Japanese producers from earning
the capital necessary for research, development and expansion of productive capacity to levels that would assure effective economies of scale,
officials in the Ministry of International Trade and Industry ("MITI")
and other economic ministries attempted to use foreign exchange and
foreign trade controls also to restrain domestic competition and promote greater concentration. MITI officials thus encouraged cartels and
other collective means of reducing "excessive" competition and the
risks of economic expansion and attempted to restrain entry and to
induce greater concentration. 30 Yet without more stringent licensing
controls or coercive powers, MITI and Japan's other economic bureaucracies generally failed to achieve their primary objectives in nearly all
"targeted" industries-integrated steel, automobiles, electronics,
pharmaceuticals, and even retailing. The failure of governmental policies to restrict entry thus ensured that these industries remained fiercely
31
competitive in their home markets.
Official policies designed to restrain competition did, however, have
an impact. By reducing the risks of investment, these policies
encouraged firms to expand their productive capacity and to increase
their share of the market 3 2 even in recessionary periods. The result was
the notable expansion in investment of the mid-1960s and the conse33
quent impetus toward expansion of exports as a result of overcapacity.
4
Thus Japanese exports began to increase rapidly in the late 1960s.3
Concomitant with the resulting increase in Japan's share of world
markets, a marked shift occurred in the composition ofJapan's exports
away from textiles and light industry products to such higher value28. D. HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 19.
29. A caveat is necessary. Some U.S. and other foreign enterprises did manage to
penetrate the barriers by tough bargaining. As exemplified by DuPont's participation
in Japan's petrochemical industry in the late 1950s and Texas Instruments' entry in
Japan's integrated circuits market, foreign firms could gain access by demanding

entry in return for Japanese access to technology considered necessary for Japanese
industrial expansion.
30. See Iyori, Antitrust and hIdustrialPolicy hi Japan, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES or

56, 57 (Saxonhouse & Yamamura eds. 1986).
31. See Haley, Administrative Guidance versus Formal Regulation: Resohing the Paradox

THE JAPANESE ECONOMY

of hIdustmial Policy, in LAW

AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY:
AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 107.

AMERICAN

32. Yamamura, Success That Solved: Administrative Guidance and Cartels in Japan, in
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THEJAPANESE ECONOMY: AMERICAN AND JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES, supra note 30, at 77, 88.

33. Id. at 99-100.
34. Komiya & Itoh, supra note 27, at 186.
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added exports as steel, automobiles, and consumer electronics.3 5 It was
not until after the first oil shock in 1973, however, that domestic markets
could no longer absorb the lion's share of annual increases in Japanese
production. Thus after 1975 exports become truly critical for Japan's
continued economic growth with rising dependency on U.S. markets.
From the mid-1970s Japanese exports of goods increased sharply, with
36
nearly a 45 percent gain in dollar value between 1975 and 1977 alone.
During this period the U.S. share of Japanese exports remained a relatively constant 23 to 25 percent, with a slight decrease in 1975.3 7 But
between 1982 and 1986, the U.S. share increased from 26.2 percent to
38.5 percent. 38
As a consequence of protectionist barriers, arguably, Japanese manufacturers were overwhelmingly the beneficiaries of the postwar growth
in Japanese consumer and industrial consumption. Japan's economic
recovery produced new wealth that through consumption generated sufficient domestic demand to justify further industrial expansion, increasingly financed by the savings economic growth also created.3 9 However,
when Japanese consumers bought new telephones, radios, watches,
cameras, televisions and cars, they bought Japanese. Industrial producers did likewise. By the mid-1970s Japan had become the world's second largest consumer market, yet imported goods supplied only a tiny
portion of that market. Although during the two decades between the
early 1960s and the early 1980s Japanese exports of goods, services and
income rose from about 11 percent of GNP, 40 imports of manufactures
41
remained constant at slightly below 3 percent.
In terms of the contribution of consumption capacity, the effectiveness of protectionist policies until the mid-1970s can therefore be considered a critical factor in promoting Japanese economic growth and
international trade competitiveness. As Japan's consumption rose, the
protectionist barriers meant that only Japanese producers benefited.
Domestic consumer demand thus spurred new industrial expansion,
new entry and even greater competitiveness. In turn, by the late 1960s
Japan's leading producers of televisions, automobiles and other consumer goods as well as steel, machine tools and other industrial products had achieved the economies of scale, managerial skills and other
advantages to enable them not only to dominate Japanese markets but
also to compete effectively in foreign markets. 42 (Such conclusions
remain speculative, of course, since we do not know for certain what
35. Id.
36. T. NAKAMURA, supra note 9, at 238.
37. E.

LINCOLN, JAPAN: FACING ECONOMIC MATURITY

226 (1988).

38. Id.
39. See T. NAKAMURA, supra note 9, at 51-52.
40. Komiya & Itoh, supra note 27, at 187 (Table 3).
41. Saxonhouse, ComparativeAdvantage, Structural Adaptation, andJapanese Peformaice, in 2 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JAPAN: THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT, supra note 4, at 231 (Table 5).

42. See, e.g., D. HENDERSON, supra note 26, at 243.
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would have occurred had there been no protectionist barriers in the
43
1950s and 1960s, despite economists' models.)
This line of reasoning is especially attractive, however, because it
helps to explain why the removal of nearly all significant formal protectionist barriers by the early 1970s did not result in a corresponding
increase in imports into Japan. As Saxonhouse reminds US, 4 4 by the
early 1970s,Japan had dismantled most formal barriers to manufactured
goods. Throughout the 1980s Japan had lower tariffs and fewer quotas
for manufactured products than the United States and the EEC, except
for Austria, and than any other West European state. By the 1980s,
however, Japan's domestic producers in key industries had not only
established competitive dominance in their home markets but they had
become fierce rivals internationally as well.
However accurate this argument may be for certain products and
producers, such as televisions and automobiles, it does not explain the
many instances in which Japanese producers, although not competitive
abroad, still managed to dominate their domestic markets without the
benefits of formal protectionist barriers after the early 1970s. The
nature of the American response was a significant factor.
C.

The United States Responds

The United States reacted to Japan's emergence as a competitive
global trader with two contradictory approaches, driven by domestic
political concerns.
The first approach was to induce Japan to join in the postwar multinational economic order grounded in free trade principles. As early as
1953, under American sponsorship, Japan began to participate informally in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"),
becoming a contracting member in 1955. Not until the mid-1960s, however, did the United States begin to exert sustained pressure on Japan to
abandon import trade and foreign investment restrictions. In 1964
Japan had become an Article 8 member of the International Monetary
Fund, obligating it to refrain from imposing quantitative restrictions on
imports for purposes of balance-of-payments equilibrium. Yet, as noted
previously, Japan's immediate response was to intensify restrictions.
Not until 1968 did theJapanese government begin to implement liberalization measures, and then only gradually over a five year period. The
United States' efforts to open Japan through bilateral negotiations gradually increased in intensity as Japan's merchandise trade surpluses with
the United States began to mount from the late 1960s. The rapid
growth in Japan's trade surplus in manufactured goods in the late 1970s
and 1980s, despite substantial reduction of trade and investment restric43. For an example of a contrary view, see Saxonhouse, supra note 4 1.
44. Id. at 231-32. See also UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,
FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL TARGETING AND ITS EFFECTS ON U.S. INDUSTRIES, PHASE 1: JAPAN

65-69 (1983).
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tions, produced even more strident demands for reciprocity and positive
action to facilitate U.S. access to Japanese markets. Even then, however,
American efforts to persuade Japan to open its markets were mild in
comparison with countervailing protectionist tendencies to provide
relief for U.S. industries affected most by Japanese exports to the United
States.
The conflict over Japanese cotton textiles exports established the
dominant pattern of the U.S. response. 45 U.S. officials, particularly in
the State Department, were concerned primarily with the broader context of global barriers to trade and the United States' leadership in fostering a liberal international economic order. Fearful that the political
influence of the U.S.-textile industry particularly in the Southeast might
scuttle U.S. efforts to advance multilateral reductions of trade barriers,
they attempted to quell industry complaints by paradoxically seeking
Japanese export restraints. Preoccupied with Europe, U.S. policymakers
paid only passing attention to Japan. Neither they nor American industry foresawJapan's economic growth and the importance of its emerging
domestic markets. Japan, they seemed to think, could be treated as a
relatively insignificant exception.
For Japan, however, cotton textiles constituted throughout the
1950s the single largest export product. As late as 1960, textiles generally accounted in value for over 30 percent of all ofJapan's exports with
cotton fabric and apparel over 8 percent of the total. For purposes of
comparison, export of iron and steel combined was slightly under 10
percent, ships and tankers about 7 percent and automobiles less than 2
46
percent.
In the early 1950s, U.S. cotton manufacturers had begun to complain bitterly ofJapanese imports and to seek administrative and legislative action. Although, as a defensive U.S. State Department noted, in
1955 the annual rate of cotton textile imports from Japan amounted to
only about one percent of U.S. domestic production and less than 20
percent of U.S. exports,4 7 for certain manufactured items such as
blouses, the Japanese share of the U.S. market was climbing to considerably higher levels. 48 As the threat of restrictive U.S. regulatory action
increased, however, Japanese industry representatives proposed direct,
private negotiations to settle the issue without bilateral government
intervention and, in 1955, accepted a unilateral quota. The American
side rejected these measures in favor of governmentally imposed legal
restrictions. 49 U.S. officials responded by secretly negotiating with the
45. See I. DESTLER & H.
(1982); J. LYNCH, TOWARD

SATO, COPING WITH U.S.-JAPANESE ECONOMIC CONFLICTS
AN ORDERLY MARKET: AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF JAPAN'S
VOLUNTARY QUOTA IN CoTIrON TEXTILE EXPORTS 76 (1968); Friman, Rocks, Hardplaces

and the .Vew Protectionism: Tvtile Trade Policy Choices in the United States and Japan, 42
INT'L ORG. 689 (1988).
46. Komiya & Itoh, supra note 27, at 186, 188 (Figure 1).
47. J. DESTLER & H. SATO, supra note 45, at 2; J. LYNCH, supra note 45. at 76.
48. J. LYNCH, supra note 45, at 89.
49. Id. at 104.

1989

Luck, Law, Culture and Trade

Japanese government and Japanese manufacturers and exporters for
ostensibly unilateral, voluntary export restraints acceptable to the
United States. This then became the prevailing pattern for nearly all
trade disputes overJapanese exports to the United States: steel, 50 color
54
53
52
televisions, 5 1 automobiles, machine tools, and integrated circuits.
In each case, American industry resorted to whatever legal means
were available, using trade, antitrust and custom laws to curtailJapanese
competition in U.S. markets. When existing law was thought inadequate, domestic industries lobbied for new legislation and more stringent administrative regulations. Forced to balance American strategic
interests as well as U.S. commitments to the postwar liberal trade order
against the inflexibility and potential damage of any new U.S. protectionist legislation, in almost every instance U.S. policymakers in the
executive branch opted for unilateral consensual restraints by the
Japanese.
Nevertheless, in the course of an unending series of trade conflicts,
U.S. policy emphasis also shifted. By the 1970s and 1980s, voluntary
export restraints by Japan ceased to be thought of as temporary, rearguard measures. They had become instead the primary instrument of an
increasingly defensive U.S. trade policy.
Staggering trade deficits withJapan, especially after 1985, produced
new demands for positive Japanese action to open its markets. Neither
continued removal of remaining formal barriers to foreign entry nor the
dramatic reevaluations of the yen relative to the U.S. dollar in 1971 and
1985 seemed, as noted, to affect U.S. merchandise exports to Japan.
The end result was even greater disarray among U.S. policymakers, with
substantially greater congressional influence over U.S. trade policy, the
advocacy of more extreme measures and the adoption of even more ad
hoc solutions, as well as a deepening loss of confidence in the basic
premises of postwar U.S. trade policy. 5 5 Nor as evidenced by many of
the articles in this volume, is any end to this process in sight. We can
only anticipate further deterioration of our ability to deal with trade
within any comprehensive policy objectives and a concomitant series of
industry-specific approaches dictated by private sector interests with
consequent likelihood of even greater incremental protectionist measures. Even demands for reciprocity and open Japanese markets have
50. See Patrick & Sato, The Political Economy of United States-Japan Trade in Steel, in
LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY,

supra note 30, at 197-236.

51. See Yamamura & Vandenberg, Japan's Rapid Growth Policy on Trial: The Television Case, in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, supra note 30.

52. Matsushita & Repeta, Restrictingthe Supply ofJapanese.Automobiles: Sovereign Compulsion or Sovereign Collusion, 14 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 47 (1982).
53.
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LEAD 219-29 (1988).

54. See id. at 26-70.
55. For an insider's critique of current U.S. approaches to Japan, see id. For an
example of the new challenges to prevailing views on free trade, see STRATEGIC
TRADE POLICY AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
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become subject to suspicion as disingenuous attempts to justify protec56
tionist relief from Japanese imports in U.S. markets.
II. Attitudes Toward Law, the State, and Consensual Means of
Governance
A. Paradigms of Governance
Over the past four decades, U.S. officials and corporate managers alike
have consistently parted company with their Japanese counterparts on
more than just the substantive issues of trade policy. The two sides have
approached the process of ordering trade relations with notable differences: American trade policy has been predominantly a matter of coercive legal regulation while the Japanese approach has been one of
informal, consensual restriction.
As illustrated by the cotton textile disputes, U.S. industry representatives rejected overtures by Japanese producers to deal with the problem through private, negotiated agreement, preferring instead to seek
legislative and administrative action. The U.S. side favored legal controls and resort to action by the state for protection, while the Japanese
sought to avoid state participation through consensual means of resolution and adjustment.
This is not an isolated example. Rather, it reflects profound differences in how the two societies approach the question of social ordering,
the role of law and the state. This is not to say that consensual ordering
is unknown in the United States or that state control through law is alien
to Japan. The point is simply that the two societies differ significantly in
their preference and resort to these contrasting means of social control.
In the United States, law-and thereby state control-is the normal
if not exclusive recourse for social ordering. Consensual approaches in
contrast tend to be disfavored not only as a matter of societal preference
but also as a legitimate alternative to control. For example, the objectives of collective private controls are condemned as collusive or conspiratorial, as in the case of price-fixing through governmental action.
The legitimacy of the conduct thus tends to be defined less by its effects
than its form. In other words, state action through courts, legislatures
and administrative agencies is acceptable where private consensual
action is disallowed. The consequence is to reinforce reliance on the
state and to enhance the state's powers of coercion.
In Japan the tendency to avoid legal regulation and coercive state
measures is equally evident. Legal ordering and controls are of course
accepted but more often than not as a framework within which consensual ordering functions. Governmental protection is a last resort, to be
56. See, e.g., Cutts, What the Construction Wrangle is Really About, 4 PHP INTERSECT 8
(Sept. 1988), noting that despite U.S. demands for access in bidding for the new
Kansai airport construction contracts, U.S. construction companies have not, in fact,

seriously sought to participate. "They have been speaking with forked tongues to
everyone." Id. at 14.
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sought out of necessity and the failure of consensual means of maintaining or enforcing order. Such attitudes rest in large measure on a deeply
imbedded but hardly anomalous conception of the persuasive authority
of the state. As explained by Masao Maruyama:
Whereas in the West national power after the Reformation was based on
formal, external sovereignty, the Japanese State never came to the point
of drawing a distinction between the external and internal spheres and of
recognizing that its authority was valid only for the former ....
[TlheJapanese State,
being a moral entity, monopolized the right to determine
57
values.
In other words, the conception of the modem state in Japan did not
include intrinsic limits on the scope of its authority.
However inclusive the jurisdiction of those who govern, a myriad of
well-developed, social-political arrangements reduced or constrained
their coercive powers with concomitant reinforcement of social mechanisms for maintaining order and channeling behavior. These constraints included a denial of the powers of coercive command as an
inherent aspect of authority. As Takie Sugiyama Lebra observes, "The
image of divine King, absolute ruler, or despot who serves as the prime
ruler in secular society" 58 is alien to Japan. Whether a protective reaction or an incidental aspect of Japan's political culture, in Japan authority may be persuasive, but not so the power to control or coerce.
Given this prevailing separation of power from authority, postwar
Japanese economic bureaucracies are best described as managers whose
capacity to govern rests principally upon their ability to achieve consent.
Their authority to govern, like that of the Meiji State, seems without
limit or constraint. Yet, with the exception of residual Occupation legislation, they exercise few coercive legal powers. Thus they resort out of
necessity to negotiated consent in both the formulation and the implementation of public policy, relying on an array of legal and extralegal
sources of leverage in the bargains they must make. MITI and the other
economic ministries may provide the situs for making policy but are not
necessarily therefore its makers. Ministry officials participate and influence but they do not unilaterally decide or command. 59
It is not necessary here to offer a full explanation for these contrasts.6 0 Suffice it to say that I believe they are closely related to histori57. M.
(1963).
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58. T. LEBRA, JAPANESE PATrERNS OF BEHAVIOR 14 (1976).
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cal patterns of governance and the means Japanese have adopted to
preserve autonomy from intrusive rulers. The cultural and institutional
context of postwar Japan thus reinforced preexisting patterns and
thereby the legitimacy and viability of consensual ordering as an alternative to state control through legal regulation. As a result, not only have
Japanese governmental authorities been forced to rely on negotiated
consent as the primary means for implementing economic policies, but
Japanese firms have also been able to make use of a myriad of consensual arrangements as a means to ensure their survival in the increasingly
competitive Japanese markets.
The prevailing pattern of consensual ordering in contemporary
Japan is evident in the complex network of long-term contractual relationships and persuasive reliance on relational contracting. 6 1 As
recently described by Laura Tyson and John Zysman:
These networks are significant and varied. Distribution channels, as is
widely noted, are arcane. Webs of suppliers linked to dominant companies abound. Firms depend on close and long term ties to a small
number of suppliers rather than seeking the best price at any moment
from a large set of bidders. These long term "business relationships" do
not embody guarantees, but a set of virtual efforts to work through
problems rather than walk away from them. They also imply privileged
access to attempt new sales or new lines of cooperation,
access built on
62
trust that would be unavailable to outsiders.
One might add "whether native or foreign" because the impediments to
new entry that these arrangements create apply equally well to both.
Illustrative of Japanese reliance on consensual ordering is the role
of trade associations and cartels as instruments of protection and for
negotiating the content and implementation of economic policy. Since
the late 1930s economic policy in Japan has been implemented principally through collective organizations of the effected industries. Cartels
and trade associations in Japan thus have distinctive governmental as
well as economic and lobbying functions. 6 3 The result often is to give
industry a determinative voice as government and industry representatives repeatedly seek consensual solutions to both immediate- and longterm economic problems. Negotiated deals and bargained for solutions
thus represented the dominant Japanese mode of economic policymaking and enforcement.
Japanese political economy sponsored by the Japan Political Economy Research
Committee.
61. See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 51.
62. Tyson & Zysman, Preface: The Argument Outlined, in POLITICS AND PRODUCTIVrrY: THE REAL STORY OF WHY JAPAN WORKS xviii

1989).
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Protective legislative denials of coercive administrative power and
similar informal political controls used to offset the extensive scope of
state authority as well as business patterns of consensual ordering are
both best understood as strategies for autonomy and survival. 64 Only
by denying government the means of coercion and outwardly adhering
to the normative demands of the community is the individual in Japan
often able to achieve security and a measure of freedom from control by
others. As such these relationships are all the more resistant to change.
The dynamics of these social patterns thus tend to be one-directional. They are more easily reinforced than dislodged. To challenge
their continuation, therefore, is to threaten an established order and the
economic survival of its participants.
B.

Voluntary Export Restraints: Ceding the Advantage to Japan

In the confrontation between the United States and Japan over trade,
the protectionist emphasis of the American response ultimately ensured
that Japanese patterns of social ordering would prevail and with it, the
participation of affected Japanese industries in the outcome and a hardening of protective consensual restraints against new entry. Consequently, no solution that would significantly impair the interests of
Japanese industry could realistically be expected. Moreover, successful
foreign competition in Japanese markets became even less likely.
As the Voluntary Export Restraint ("VER") increasingly became the
standard device for resolving trade disputes, the Japanese government
officials increasingly played the mediating role between the United
States and the affected Japanese industry. Their intervention was
required by the United States to initiate the restraint but they were
required by the affected Japanese firms to offset or at least mitigate any
substantial disadvantage. The Japanese industry in question thus
ensured its autonomy in the bargain. No measure that seriously
threatened survival would be tolerated and it could effectively press for
any advantages to be gained.
The VER was also advantageous for the Japanese in that it functioned essentially as an authorized cartel. 6 5 It gave therefore the participating firms a legitimized vehicle for cooperation (or collusion) for
purposes that might not have otherwise been permitted, including
exclusion of new entrants. It even had advantageous impact in the
United States. For example, fearing that a Supreme Court decision in
the Zenith-NAUE 66 case subjecting Japanese TV manufacturers to American antitrust proscription might jeopardize the VER negotiated for
automobiles, the United States intervened on behalf of the Japanese
64. For comparative insight into the relationship of strong societies, weak states
and "strategies of survival," see J. MIGDAL, STRONG SOCIETIES AND WEAK STATES

(1988).
65. See Yamamura & Vandenberg, supra note 51.
66. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
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defendants. 6 7 Indeed, the interests of American producers and the Japanese rivals that had already established themselves in the U.S. market
may have coincided in that both gained from greater price stability and
restrictions on output.
The VER also had advantages for the economic bureaucracies that
monitored compliance. As mediators between U.S. government authorities and the instrumental actors in the private sector on both sides of
the Pacific, they became even more indispensable and gained additional
leverage against all sides.
The resort to the VER by American officials also illustrates the disadvantages inherent in resort to legal controls. U.S. officials had few
options; any unilateral action by U.S. authorities carried political and
legal risks. Economic interests had to be weighed against security interests. Measures taken against one Japanese industry would create precedents for use against others. Any action would produce political
controversy and criticism that this action was inconsistent with U.S. free
trade principles. If existing statutory or regulatory controls were inadequate, an attempt to seek new legislation and regulations would risk a
Pandora's box of unwanted restrictions with global implications. And,
as illustrated by the steel VER agreement in 1972, informal action by the
United States was open to judicial challenge as ultra vires. 68
American authorities were thus caught in the midst of a complex set
of conflicting interests and concerns. Better by far, therefore, to rely on
informal Japanese restraints than on any U.S. action.
American reliance on export restraints by the Japanese have proved
in the long run, however, to be detrimental to U.S.-interests. As a shortlived, quick fix, the VER postponed that much longer the realization that
greater reciprocity in access to Japanese markets was the only viable
alternative to broad closure of U.S. markets with devastating risks to
world trade and the global economy. As temporary relief, the VER also
tended to obscure the weakness of state power in Japan. Japanese government officials appeared to deliver on their promises and seemed
from afar to be in commanding control. Hidden from American view,
however, was the intensity of the bargaining and the concessions the
government had to make.
In the interim provided by VERs, bureaucratic leverage in Japan
grew progressively weaker as the private sector prospered and became
more entrenched domestically and internationally. Moreover, in the
end, the United States also lost the moral claim for reciprocity.
C.

Reciprocity Versus National Treatment

American demands for reciprocity in Japan have little moral appeal as
"fair" inJapan. To the United States' insistence that U.S. enterprises be
67. Matsushita & Repeta, supra note 52.
68. See, e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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given the same access to markets in Japan thatJapanese enterprises have
in the United States, Japanese can quite as fairly cry "foul." Because
Japanese firms themselves face equally severe restrictions in access to
capital, distribution networks and other prerequisites for new entry in
their home markets as foreign entrants, to ensure reciprocity rather than
equal or national treatment requires special favors for U.S. firms. With
equal claim to fairness, the Japanese respond by offering national treat69
ment. Take, for example, the legal profession.
In the United States most threshold restrictions against admission
of foreign nationals to the practice of law have been removed. Supreme
Court decisions have eliminated citizenship 70 and raised doubts about
state residency requirements. 7 1 Several states, especially California and
New York, have gone further by easing educational requirements. 72 As
a result, several hundred Japanese nationals have been admitted to practice in the United States, many of whom have failed to pass the national
test necessary for qualification to practice law in Japan.
To become a lawyer inJapan, with the minor exception of university
professors, one must pass a national examination (shih5 shiken) for
admission to the Legal Research and Training Institute (Shih5Kensh7
Sho), designed originally to train judges and public procurators. 73 Each
year less than 500 applicants pass the examination, currently only about
2 percent of all applicants. 74 In contrast, the lowest passing rate for any
state law examination in the United States is California's near 40 percent
with the national average above 60 percent. 75 National treatment thus
significantly advantages Japanese. Japanese nationals have greater
access to the market for legal services in the United States than U.S.
nationals have in Japan. Reciprocity, on the other hand, would require
thatJapan prefer U.S. citizens in admission to practice over equally qualified Japanese. In short, reciprocity would require the Japanese to discriminate against their own nationals.
Even aside from the issue of entry barriers, the more fundamental
questions of market risk and profitability remain. Even if there were no
barriers of any sort to entry, it is not at all certain that many U.S. firms
would choose to enter Japan. The cutthroat rivalry of most Japanese
69. See Haley, The New Regulaloy Regime for Foreign Lawyers in Japan, 5 UCLA PAC.
(1986).
70. In re Giffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
71. Supreme Court v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
72. Education requirements have been eased to permit foreign law faculty graduates to take bar examinations with only a graduate law degree from an ABA approved
law school, usually a one year LL.M. degree program, in Alaska, Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, New York, North Carolina, Puerto Rico,
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markets and the attendant commercial risks for any new entrant are not
inviting for outside enterprises. In addition, few U.S. firms are attracted
by the profit margins of many sectors of the Japanese economy in which
they might become strong rivals. 76 Thus many U.S. manufacturers now
write Japan off. For them the only option left is protectionist restriction
of Japanese competition at home.
Conclusion: Is Continuous Trade Conflict Inevitable?
Culture is not immutable. Institutional reform does change expectations and values as people reorder their lives and the self-organizing
mechanisms of any society adjust. Radical cultural change, however, seldom occurs solely from within. Rather, as the history of modern Japan
demonstrates so well, external forces commonly provide the catalyst for
internal reform. But even then, change is far more likely to follow patterns legitimated by preexisting attitudes and values. Even war, defeat
and the Allied Occupation of Japan with all of its institutional reforms
did not transform Japanese patterns of social ordering.
The economic organization of postwar Japan is an unlikely candidate for exception. The consensual mechanisms that have ensured at
least stability, if not survival, as well as a significant degree of autonomy
within the managerial state have only hardened as Japan has emerged as
a global economic power. With that emergence the political and economic leverage enjoyed by the United States has diminished
accordingly.
Yet without unwanted changes in the most basic patterns of social
and political organization as well as fundamental values and attitudes in
either Japan or the United States or both, there is little hope of lasting
equilibrium in bilateral trade without continuing tension and conflict.
The best Japanese manufacturers can only be expected to continue
to produce goods that effectively rival the products of their U.S. competitors in price and quality in U.S. markets and to continue as well to have
the home advantage. Their success in turn can also be expected to continue to provoke protectionist reactions with demands for new legislative and regulatory measures to constrain Japanese competition.
U.S. domestic resistance to protectionism must also be anticipated
with the most likely compromise being renewed public pressure for
some means to "level the playing field" and to ensure reciprocity in
access to Japanese markets. TheJapanese cannot be expected to accommodate these demands.
The inability or reluctance of Japanese authorities to satisfy these
demands-most likely perceived in the United States as intransigenceis almost certain in turn to incite more hostility and conflict-perhaps
placated temporarily by well-publicized but largely cosmetic market76. This rather obvious point can be understood as an inevitable advantage Japanese firms have in their home market. To exist, they must remain despite low profits.
Foreign firms need the attraction of higher profitability.
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opening pronouncements and schemes plus negotiated VER agreements with the most visible of Japan's successful industries to restrain
exports often to their advantage. In other words, we should expect
more of the same.
The political dynamics on both sides of the Pacific also point to continuation of conflict. In both Japan and the United States a marked
increase is evident in legislative intervention and the influence of legislators with special interest concerns. 77 This trend makes all the more difficult any attempt at resolution of trade issues through bureaucratic,
government-to-government negotiation.
A different scenario is possible but difficult to predict. Consensual
ordering in Japan leaves its lesser communities, including the firm, a
much wider margin for autonomous action than is generally understood.
The capacity of the Japanese for survival-plus perhaps their apparent
propensity for good luck-may result in new arrangements. The patterns of Japanese investment in the United States from Montana cattle
ranches to Florida citrus groves suggests another sort of resolution, one
involving greater economic integration of firms and markets. Perhaps,
one day, we shall discover that the label "made in Japan" no longer has
meaning. Until that time comes, however, the past suggests that the
United States-Japanese trade conflict is indeed intractable.

77. See, e.g., Calder, American Political and the Trans-Pacific Economy, 12 THE
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note 63, at 153.
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